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WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH EVIDENCE?
Kenneth W. Graham, Jr.*
"Does evidence law matter?" Why ask someone who put three kids
through college on less than half of the Federal Rules of Evidence? Per-
haps because few other witnesses to the importance of evidence law are
unimpeachable. Consider:
-Richard Nixon, who wanted the Watergate investigation moved
from the Ervin Committee to a federal grand jury because he (errone-
ously) supposed that the rules applied in grand jury proceedings;1
-Susan Komisaruk, who saw a press release stating her justification
for a kamikaze attack on the Warfare State edited into a confession of
guilt because someone forgot Rule 106;2
-Dalkon Shield victims, who were subjected to sexist and humiliat-
ing questions about their personal sexual and toilet practices because
rules of evidence do not apply in discovery;3
-the Fourth Circuit, which was able to deny a claim for the parent-
child communications privilege and accept expansive claims for govern-
mental privilege because Congress could not understand the politics of
privilege.4
It would be much easier to assemble an impressive list of those who
don't think much of the rules of evidence. For example:
* Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles, School of Law; A.B., 1957;
J.D., 1962, University of Michigan.
1. RICHARD M. NIXON, THE WHITE HOUSE TRANSCRIPTS 171 (Gerald Gold ed., 1974);
see FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(2) (providing that Rules are not applicable to grand jury
proceedings).
2. United States v. Komisaruk, 885 F.2d 490, 495-96 (9th Cir. 1989); see FED. R. EVID.
106 (providing that when any statement is introduced, adverse party may require introduction
of any other statement that ought to be considered contemporaneously).
3. MORTON MINTz, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON
SHIELD 194 (1985); see FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
4. See United States v. Jones, 683 F.2d 817, 818-19 (4th Cir. 1982) (refusing to recognize
parent-child privilege); In re United States Dep't of Justice, No. 87-1205, slip op. at 3 (4th Cir.
Apr. 7, 1988) (unpublished opinion extending Classified Information Procedures Act, 18
U.S.C.A. app. 3, §§ 1-16 (1985), which by its own terms is limited to criminal cases, to civil
case cited in United States v. Smith, 706 F. Supp. 593, 595 (M.D. Tenn. 1989)). Congress did
not like what the Advisory Committee had done with privileges so it deleted the privileges
article and left the common law privileges in place, apparently in the mistaken expectation that
this would prevent the sort of class-biased privileges that the Advisory Committee had pro-
posed. See 23 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5422 (1980).
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-bar examiners, who have turned the subject over to the kind of
people who think that the right answer to a multiple-choice evidence
question is the one most often picked by those with high L.S.A.T.
scores;
5
-lawyers from Tennessee, who (if appellate opinions are any indi-
cation) haven't made an evidentiary objection in years;6
-appellate judges in California, who have turned the California Ev-
idence Code into law's equivalent of the Dead Sea Scrolls by seldom pub-
lishing opinions that discuss evidence issues;
7
-law review editors, who publish comments based on "facts"
gleaned from Wall Street Journal editorials while rejecting evidence arti-
cles as "mere doctrinal analysis";'
-"elite law schools," most of whom have no practicing evidence
scholars on their faculties.9
But perhaps the most credible witnesses to the triviality of evidence
law would be those who teach it. Few people listed in the Association of
5. According to hearsay reports, the Multi-State Bar Exam continues its practice of giv-
ing multiple-choice questions with more than one correct answer and requiring test takers to
choose the "best" one. The mentality of the test makers was revealed to me several years ago
when I was asked to consult with the California Bar Examiners on alternative testing methods
to the essay question. When I met with the "expert" (a non-lawyer) employed by the Commit-
tee of Bar Examiners to discuss my own examinations, I explained to him that one of the
virtues of my tests was that they sometimes rewarded people who had otherwise undist-
inguished academic records based largely on essay examinations. The "expert" blanched.
That would not do, he explained to me, because my tests are "invalid"; a "valid" test, I discov-
ered, was one that rewarded the same people who did well on essay examinations and the Law
School Aptitude Test. The proposed alternative evidence examination was not adopted.
6. Those of us who read many appellate opinions are often struck by the differing court-
room cultures in which the supposedly "uniform" law of evidence operates. There is wide
variation from state to state in the frequency with which evidentiary objections surface in the
appellate reports and the style in which they are resolved. Why the "law and society" people
have never picked up such questions for empirical study is a mystery.
7. This is an open scandal in the Golden State. I have it by very good hearsay that while
lawyers and judges are not allowed to cite unpublished opinions in briefs and opinions, in at
least some of the intermediate appellate courts this is not construed as barring allusions to such
opinions in oral argument in cases between institutional litigators.
8. Over the last 15 years I have submitted more than 100 suggestions for comment topics,
mostly on evidentiary issues, to the editors of a local law review. Students who persist with
such topics despite advice that they are not "comment-worthy" have had great difficulty get-
ting their comments published. In one case, the student writer had to mount a lobbying effort
among the evidence faculty to compel the editors to publish what may be the best thing ever
written on the subject with which it deals. Happily, not all law reviews take such a narrow
view of their role. See, e.g., Michael H. Graham, Special Topics in the Law of Evidence, 42 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 829 (1988).
9. The reader is invited to use any list of the top 10 law schools and try to recall the
names of the evidence teachers at these institutions (no peeking at the A.A.L.S. Directory,
please) and the articles they have written in the last 20 years.
WHAT'S THE MATTER?
American Law Schools (A.A.L.S.) Directory of Law Teachers under the
heading "Evidence" have found anything in the subject to stir them to
write."° Many continued to teach the common law of evidence long
after it had been supplanted by the Federal Rules of Evidence and similar
state codifications. The published casebooks suggest that some still teach
the rules as if they were no more than tools for trial tactics or apolitical
compromises among the competing goals of fairness and efficiency. Con-
versations at an A.A.L.S. teaching conclave lead me to believe that most
evidence teachers, for understandable but not always persuasive reasons,
teach only a small portion of the subject (most commonly hearsay, rele-
vancy and witnesses) and prefer to skip the more blatantly partisan rules,
such as privileges and quasi-privileges.
There are a number of good reasons for evidence teachers to be em-
barrassed by their subject. But in my view, a large part of the blame (or
credit) for the current state of evidentiary teaching and scholarship
should go to the ideology that dominates discussion of the subject-a
combination of attitudes, assumptions and amnesia that its adherents like
to call the "rationalist tradition," but that I prefer to label the "Progres-
sive Procedural Paradigm."' I If one takes the Progressive view that ex-
isting rules of evidence are anachronistic obstacles to the search for
Truth that we will abandon when the light of Science leads us to a purer
procedure for resolving disputed questions of objective fact, then teach-
ing students to understand and use those rules makes one something of a
traitor to the cause of Progress. Once the Federal Rules of Evidence
made it clear to everyone just how far we were from entering the Pro-
gressive Valhalla, trying to teach students that the Rules are merely tem-
porary expedients to be overthrown or abandoned is to play out a
ludicrous academic version of Waitingfor Godot.
10. I have the impression that things may have improved somewhat in the last 10 years,
but a decade or so ago I was asked to write an article for a proposed law review symposium on
the 10 best evidence articles of the previous decade. A preliminary reconnoiter suggested to
me that it would be difficult to predict who would be more outraged by such a listing-those
who found their work ranked with articles on the lower half of the list or those who found
their work left out.
11. I had thought this was a reasonably obvious phenomenon when it was first brought to
my attention in an article written over 20 years ago. See Douglas Ayer, In Quest of Efficiency:
The Ideological Journey of Thurman Arnold in the Interwar Period, 23 STAN. L. REV. 1049
(1971). I discovered otherwise when I mentioned it in a book. review. Kenneth W. Graham,
Jr., The Persistence of Progressive Proceduralism, 61 TEX. L. REv. 929, 940 (1983) (reviewing
JULIUS BYRON LEVINE, DISCOVERY: A COMPARISON BETWEEN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN
CIVIL DISCOVERY LAW WITH REFORM PROPOSALS (1982)). For a not very successful at-
tempt to sketch the tenets of the ideology, see Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., "There'll Always Be
An England" The Instrumental Ideology of Evidence, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1204, 1228-30 (1987)
(reviewing WILLIAM TWINNING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM & WIGMORE (1985)).
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A poignant example of the absurdities of the Progressive posture
comes from a recent gathering of these scholar-politicians. One would-be
revolutionary, buoyed with the enthusiasm that comes from confusing
originality with a bad memory, trotted out the old Progressive argument
that because we all rely on hearsay in conducting our daily affairs, we
ought to be willing to let judges and jurors use it in deciding lawsuits.
No one present apparently had the heart to point out to this precocious
Mr. Magoo that while we do all rely on hearsay, that is hardly a matter
of choice. Given the opportunity, most of us would prefer to put the
used car salesman under oath and subject Dan Rather to cross-
examination.
We can safely assume that most evidence teachers are aware that
judges and litigators are not the only people in the world who have to act
on the basis of knowledge that was not obtained through personal inves-
tigation and perception. Yet most of us teach evidence as if it was useful
only to those who want to pass the bar and become famous litigators. I
know I do. But even I can imagine a course called "Evidence in Every-
day Life" in which the rules of evidence are used as a source of principles
for students to use in making judgments of fact in their personal and
professional lives, even if they never see the inside of a courtroom. If the
hearsay reports are reliable, my colleague Robert Garcia did something
like this in a very effective class based on the televised Clarence Thomas
confirmation hearings.
It is not surprising that few evidence teachers take this approach.
Many of the same people who profess not to believe in the hearsay rule
have little difficulty believing what they read in the New York Times.12
The morning after Soviet pilots mistakenly shot down Korean Airlines
Flight 007, I was exchanging hearsay-based opinions on this event with
several people. A well-known evidence teacher suggested that the inci-
dent would have a demoralizing effect on what he called "the peace
movement." There was agreement all around, even after it was pointed
out that the tragedy seemed to confirm the fears of many peace activists
by showing how we might stumble into a nuclear war. As I walked away
from this puzzling conversation, I spotted a copy of that morning's news-
paper abandoned on the floor. It carried a small headline on the front
page to the effect: "Peace Movement Demoralized By Attack."
12. This is not an original observation. When I was very young and situated in a different
educational institution, I once remarked to my mentor that the faculty seemed much more
willing to discuss an unfolding historical event in the afternoon than they were in the morning.
My mentor replied, in words or substance, "Yes, until the New York Times arrives in the
library at noon, they don't know what they are supposed to think."
[Vol. 25:773
WHAT'S THE MATTER?
Our role as critics of the political manipulation of the rules of evi-
dence by judges and lawyers can lead us to forget that the rules would
not have survived this long if they did not contain a core of common
sense. This can be dramatized by comparing law to the work of profes-
sionals who pride themselves on having no rules of evidence. I once read
a highly acclaimed historical work in which an important part of the
argument rested on the publication in a union newspaper of what pur-
ported to be a letter from a union member.13 Surely the author was cor-
rect in not ignoring the letter merely because it was inadmissible hearsay,
but to rely heavily on it without any attempt to establish its authenticity
seems foolhardy. One assumes that the author was aware that unions of
that era were frequently infiltrated by Pinkertons who were as willing to
engage in COINTELPRO activities as Mr. Hoover's F.B.I. minions. In
another place in the same work, the author quotes at length the testi-
mony of a witness at a legislative hearing without alerting the reader to
the fact that this witness was an attorney for one of the parties in the
controversy being discussed-a fact relevant to the use being made of his
testimony, but not likely to be known by many readers.
Given their gleeful contempt for lawyers, journalists are an espe-
cially apt exemplar of the consequences of the untutored use of evidence.
The lead story in the Los Angeles Times on a recent Thursday morning
began this way:
Reviled by most of the world, its grip on the Soviet Union wan-
ing by the hour, the hard-line Kremlin junta that ousted Presi-
dent Mikhail S. Gorbachev collapsed Wednesday, and
Gorbachev returned to Moscow, reassuring his people and the
world that he is again in "full control."14
If we make the reasonable inference that the writer of these lines does not
speak Russian, there is only a single fact in this entire paragraph of
which he could have had personal knowledge. The rest is a mess of
highly questionable opinions with uncertain bases and which could only
have the most tenuous relationship to empirical fact. Since many Soviet
citizens were sympathetic to the coup and most Chinese probably una-
13. Here, as elsewhere in this Essay, I have not thought it desirable to single out by cita-
tion individuals I have chosen as exemplars of much wider failings. If the examples do not
resonate with the reader's own experience, it is doubtful that a footnote filled with documenta-
tion will make my argument more persuasive. In any event, I have little interest in persuading
those who will only believe when they can see someone squirming in pain.
14. Soviet Coup Collapses; Gorbachev Returns, in "Full Control," L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 22,
1991, at Al. Readers who undertake a similar analysis of their own newspapers will likely
discover that this sort of "objective, factual" reporting (to quote an L.A. Times TV ad) is not
atypical.
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ware of it, it seems rash to suppose that this substantial portion of "the
world" was busy reviling the junta. "Grip on the Soviet Union" seems
an inept way to characterize the precarious position of plotters depen-
dent on the support of key military and security forces for their success.
"Hard-line Kremlin junta" may be useful to dramatize its "collapse," but
it is a misleading description of either the goals or tactics of the bungling
bureaucrats who were supposed tobe reviving Stalinism by holding press
conferences.
In the face of this kind of stupidity in dealing with fact, it is difficult
to keep a straight face when reformers argue that courts would be im-
proved if judges emulated historians and journalists and abandoned ef-
forts to develop rules or principles for dealing with evidence. True, we
may reasonably question whether exclusion of evidence is the best way to
implement such rules or principles. It may well be that society would be
better off if evidence were taught in kindergarten and beyond rather than
only in the second year of law school. But the suggestion that we simply
abolish the exclusionary rules and rely on the adversary system to pro-
duce the best available evidence seems naive in a world in which even
judges and lawyers buy cars to improve their sex lives rather than to
transport them efficiently from point A to point B. "
But evidence scholars have not yet developed alternatives to the ex-
clusionary rules. Our would-be reformers rely on the quintessential capi-
talist doctrine of "creative destruction" and on blind faith in judicial
discretion to replace the razed Wigmorean structure with something bet-
ter. But the notion that self-interest moderated by a discretionary bu-
reaucracy is an effective social regulator is hard to square with the
evidence of Los Angeles, where we are busily engaged in destroying the
old and constructing the new with no discernable public sense that the
community is being improved. While a few individuals have enriched
themselves by exploiting the faith or paranoia of others, most Angelenos
take little pride in the fact that our homeless sleep in the doorways of
shinier buildings than do those in Calcutta, or little comfort in the fact
that if we are shot on the street it will be by someone with a more banal
view of the world than the Sendero Luminoso guerrillas.
Given the messy state of the modern world, the daunting problems
of epistemology, and the primitive state of the science of psychology, it is
easy to understand why evidence scholars seek comfort in tending our
garden of doctrine or contemplating the angelic purity of formal the-
15. Sexy cars can serve as substitutes for grades and LSAT scores too. An inspection of
any faculty parking lot will disclose that while the reasons people buy particular models are
complex, they are also not completely rational.
[V/ol. 25:773
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ory.'6 This latter tendency is exemplified by the self-proclaimed "New
Evidence Scholarship," which looks to outsiders much like the "old con-
ceptualism" that gave Beale a bad name. While the founding members of
this school may be exempt from the charge of "pack scholarship," the
same cannot be said of all of their followers. Consider, for example, The
Flatlanders. They spend their days imagining how rules of evidence
might work in a world with only two dimensions-supply and demand..
I would be the last person to claim that no insights into the law of evi-
dence can be gained by exploring only one or two dimensions of the sub-
ject, such as power and greed. But so far as I can tell, the only thing The
Flatlanders have discovered is the political economy of economic analy-
sis; that is, how we can all get rich without reading the cases simply by
taking in each others' intellectual wash. 7
It is to be expected that evidence scholarship will be caught up in
academic fads. But it is remarkable that so far the law of evidence has
been relatively untouched by recent ideological fashions other than the
so-called "law-and-economics" movement. Feminists, except for some
splendid early writing about character evidence in rape cases, have gener-
ally ignored the law of evidence. Perhaps the desire to avoid self-ghet-
toization sometimes associated with family law may explain why there is
16. I do not claim that I have read everything written recently on the law of evidence.
Moreover, what I have read is badly skewed in the direction of those topics covered in the first
five articles of the Federal Rules of Evidence. But while I may have missed some significant
work, the remarks in the text seem like a reasonable description of the major tendencies in the
current literature.
17. Those who engage in the much despised "mere doctrinal scholarship" must read at
least some of the cases and statutes and examine enough of the prior scholarship to determine
that our "brilliant idea" is not simply unconscious plagiarism of something we read years ago.
Law review editors generally still require us to have footnotes that demonstrate some tenuous
connection between our descriptions and reality. There is the recurrent nightmare that
months of work will be undone by judicial decision or legislative enactment or that someone
finding the case we miss will expose us as the shoddy scholars we secretly fear we are. How
much more pleasant to simply sit down to write encumbered by little more than a simplistic
version of the law and a vivid imagination, and write stories about how the law operates in a
universe with only two dimensions. Then in the afternoon one can fax off the latest opus to
other members of the coterie who will eagerly tear into the piece with a "Reply to Professor
Wildwit" to which can be appended an endless series of rebuttals and surrebuttals that spiral
off into increasingly surreal worlds.
Since there are vast spaces of the law yet to be invaded by the hordes of Flatlanders, it is
easy to find an untouched topic that one can be confident, without ever going into the library,
has never been subjected to economic analysis before, thus saving time that might otherwise be
devoted to the tedious task of research. If there is a place where the argument does not seem
to hang together, one can always cut out the troublesome paragraph and insert a chart or
graph. Then at faculty meetings one can drop snotty comments about the lack of productivity
on the part of the doctrinal drones, confident that they lack the imagination to contemplate
homicide.
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no womanist writing on spousal privileges. While their sisters in science
have been able to find sexist assumptions in the epistemology of the men
in white coats, surely it is reasonable to suppose that the same virus has
infected those in black robes. Evidence has similarly been ignored by the
academic guerillas in the Critical Legal Studies movement. When even
Republicans can see class bias in the law of privilege, it is strange that the
members of the Marxist 4-H Club have averted their gaze. 8
Perhaps the problem with evidence law is that it is, in the argot of
the 1960s, "not where it's at." Legal scholars are attracted to topics
where they think their writing can make a difference. What do they see
when they look at evidence? A field where several generations of schol-
ars have failed to daunt the authority of a treatise written nearly a cen-
tury ago. A field where a series of increasingly conservative codifications
have failed to dislodge the common law mentality of judges and lawyers
who continue to look to cases and commentators rather than to statutes
and rules for authority. A field of Dreamsicles, where fools go through
the motions of teaching and research and from which the wise avert their
eyes.
Yet while many evidence teachers view evidence law with a mixture
of embarrassment and contempt, the process it purports to regulate has a
continuing fascination for the popular mind. The judicial trial is the set-
ting for more books, movies and television shows than the operating
room, the boardroom, the press room or the Oval Office. Is this because
the judicial arena partakes of the conflict of the battlefield and the prize
ring but is far less expensive to film? Or is it because in a world domi-
nated by the official truths of media moguls, the courtroom is one of the
few public places where competing truths can visibly contest, a place
where the truths we hate must not only be heard but transcribed and
preserved? But whether a trial is pantywaist warfare, the symbolic rem-
nants of a past we must close behind us, or a doorway to the future in
which the Other is heard and humanized rather than denounced and de-
stroyed, surely trials provide material for scholars as well as script
writers.
What's the matter with evidence? Better to ask: "What is wrong
with the people who ask or answer such questions"? Do they lack the
imagination to see what is happening to the law of evidence or the cour-
age to confront it? Do they lack the vision to go beyond their predeces-
sors or are they missing the hope that fueled the enthusiasm of prior
18. For those who have avoided reading works of this genre, the 4-H's are Hegel, hierar-
chy, hegemony and hueristics.
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generations? Do they respond to this Symposium out of delight or
despair?
Your witness, counsel.
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